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LABOR LAW-ARBITRATION-DUTIES OF
SUCCESSOR EMPLOYER
More than a dozen years have passed since the United States
Supreme Court first grappled with the concept of the duties and
obligations of a successor employer as framed by John Wiley &
Sons, Inc. v. Livingston.' The Wiley Court was confronted with a
binding arbitration clause that was a part of the collective bargain-
ing agreement currently in force with the union of the predecessor
company, a small corporation that was being absorbed by merger
with the Wiley Company. A suit was brought by the union of the
absorbed company under section 301 of the Labor Management
Relations Act to compel the Wiley Company management to arbi-
trate grievances as mandated by the collective bargaining agree-
ment.2 There was no clause in the agreement that bound successors
and assigns, and, in addition, since none of the Wiley Company
employees belonged to a union, there was no conflict of representa-
tional interests. Furthermore, the decision to merge was purely for
business and economic reasons. In spite of these factors, the United
States Supreme Court recognized that lack of notice of the im-
pending merger was inherently unfair to the union organization
and held that the court may make the determination that the
subject matter of a dispute is to be submitted to arbitration, and
that thereafter all procedural decisions growing out of the dispute
and its disposition could be left to the arbitrator.' The Wiley deci-
sion specifically recognized and effectuated the national labor pol-
icy of granting arbitration a central role in settling labor disputes
and easing potential industrial strife.4 Relying heavily on the lan-
' 376 U.S. 543 (1964).
2 Id. at 544-45.
3 Id. at 557.
4 Id. at 549. This federal policy was initiated in 1957, in a case providing that
when the collective bargaining agreement provided for arbitration of a grievance
upon the exhaustion of the grievance procedure, either party may force arbitration
by a Taft-Hartley § 301 suit. Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448
(1957).
Furthermore, if the claim falls within the arbitration provision of the collective
bargaining agreement, it will be resolved in favor of arbitration, regardless of the
merits of the grievance or the subsequent award. Judicial review was limited to
whether the award was reached within the authority granted to the arbitrator by
the collective bargaining agreement. United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co.,
363 U.S. 564 (1960); United Steelworkers v. Warrier & Gulf Navigation Co., 363
U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S.
593 (1960) (the "Steelworkers trilogy").
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guage of the Steelworkers trilogy,- the Wiley Court expressed its
fear that if a mere change in corporate structure or ownership were
to have the automatic consequence of removing a previously estab-
lished duty to arbitrate, the importance of arbitration might be
diminished.'
The Wiley decision was not without limitations. A majority of
the Court recognized that the successor's duty to arbitrate might
not survive in light of such compelling considerations as a lack of
continuity in the succeeding business or union abandonment of its
rights by failure to assert its claims.' In addition, the Wiley Court
declared that the preference for arbitration could be overcome only
if such compelling considerations existed.' Wiley predominantly
upheld the union's claim that federal law required arbitration go
forward and that the courts had jurisdiction to determine whether
any or all parts of the collective bargaining agreement were to
survive the merger. Thus, since the duty to arbitrate was of con-
tractual origin, the courts were to determine whether the substan-
tive collective bargaining agreement was sufficient to create the
duty to arbitrate before a compulsory submission to arbitration
could occur.'
The Wiley decision was examined in Burns International Se-
curity Services, Inc. v. NLRB. 1 As in Wiley, the major issue in
Burns was whether the successor employer had a duty to bargain
with the employees' representative of the union that was adversely
affected by the change of corporate structure. The resolution of
this issue depended upon whether a true successorship existed in
the subsequent employer. The problem, still unresolved, is that the
guidelines for determining the existence of a "successor employer"
have never been adequately and completely defined by the courts.
Another decision, Howard Johnson Co. v. Hotel Employees
Union," provided a more definitive approach to the successorship
problem but, unfortunately, still did not resolve all uncertainties.
For reasons to be discussed, the term "successor employer" should
be broad enough to encompass mergers, acquisitions,
376 U.S. at 549.
5Id.
Id. at 551.
'Id. at 549-50.
Id. at 546-47.
,0 406 U.S. 272 (1972).
417 U.S. 249 (1974).
[Vol. 78
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reorganizations, divisions, and virtually any other corporate struc-
tural change.
Starting with the assumption that changes in corporate struc-
ture are almost invariably a function of management prerogative,
definitions of "successor employers" may seem of questionable
value because, absent anti-union animus, management can gener-
ally make structural changes as it sees fit. However, the United
States Supreme Court has fostered a strong federal labor policy
that jealously guards the rights of the individual workers. 2 This
policy has enabled union counsel to arm the collective bargaining
agreement to survive corporate change. As Wiley demonstrated,
the arbitration mechanism may survive by court order even if the
substantive contents of the collective bargaining agreement do not.
Thus, employers are prevented from escaping unfavorable bargain-
ing concessions by merely reorganizing the corporate structure
each time they become dissatisfied with the current agreement.
Wiley also recognized that the collective bargaining agree-
ment is not an ordinary contract since it creates rights akin to
property rights in the employees, thus making labor policy pre-
dominate over traditional contract rules, even though one of the
parties to the litigation did not sign the agreement. 3 For the attor-
ney faced with his first successor dispute, a recognition that the
courts do vary from traditional contract interpretations should
prompt him to ask: What exactly does the arbitration clause of the
collective bargaining agreement specifically provide? Once this is
ascertained, his second task is to locate any successor and assigns
clause, carefully scrutinize its language, and ask: Who will be
bound by this clause? One author has taken the position that, even
in the absence of a successor and assigns clause, the parties are
likely to be bound for the reason that the union and the company
were free to specifically provide that successors and assigns are not
to be bound." In addition, that commentator indicated that unless
the collective bargaining agreement specifically provides other-
wise, procedural questions arising from the dispute are always for
the arbitrator." Consequently, when the agreement is silent as to
12 See Smith v. Evening News Association, 371 U.S. 195 (1962).
" 376 U.S. at 550.
" Barbash, Status of the Collective Bargaining Agreement under Wiley v.
Livingston: A Management Counsel's View, 18 N.Y.U. ANN. CONF. ON LAB. 259
(1965).
11 Id. at 262.
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a particular procedural question, the gap will likely be filled by an
interpretation tending to liberally expand the national labor policy
favoring arbitration.
There are, however, instances in which the collective bargain-
ing agreement will not survive. Business changes may be so drastic
as to require new employees with different skills or new contract
terms. Such circumstances, however, would need to be truly excep-
tional and would probably involve a substantial lack of business
continuity, causing inequitable or unreasonable results.'"
Since the union contract will usually survive the corporate
change-over, prudent corporate counsel should read the collective
bargaining agreement closely before any corporate change takes
place. The agreement may require, for example, that any acquisi-
tion of new business entities is contingent on union acquiescence.
The consequences of ignoring such specific contract language could
lead to enormous back pay liability if the rights of unionized em-
ployees are not protected. One possibility for shrewd management
counsel to reduce potential monetary damages would be to gear the
corporate change to a point in time that is very close to, or simulta-
neous with the expiration of the existing collective bargaining
agreement, being aware that there would still be proscriptions
against making unilateral changes in the terms of employment of
the existing employee group.' 7 Such an approach would minimize
back pay liabilities and limit immediate bargaining subjects to
such items as severance pay.
Depending upon the type of corporate change, a number of
items may be held to be arbitrable. If management plans a total
cessation of a portion of the business and the decision is motivated
by valid business reasons, the union may be limited only to terms
of cessation and the effects on the displaced employees. 8 However,
if the corporate reorganization is due to a merger, sale, or division,
any or all of the following may be required bargaining subjects:
seniority, contributions to pension, job security, grievances, vaca-
tion pay, and severance pay."
With this in mind, it may be advisable for all parties to keep
the current contract in force even if some of its terms are, from the
11 Id. at 273.
,7 Id. at 275.
" Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203 (1964).
" 376 U.S. at 552-54.
[Vol. 78
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management viewpoint, less than ideal. For example, businesses
that involve distribution functions could encounter challenges for
recognition by a highly organized union, such as the Teamsters, if
the unaffiliated local is no longer recognized.
Another interesting aspect of the "successor" concept is the
valid argument that a successor might really be the most remote
business entity to emerge from the reorganization," as would be
the case with the emergence of a partially or fully controlled sub-
sidiary. In such an instance, there may be variations in the new
successorship agreements and in seniority rearrangements. Since
the courts frown upon tests of strength in labor-management con-
flict situations among substantially similar operations, the parties
should be advised to bargain out the subsequent effects.'
Additional problems exist for each separate labor-
management permutation, thus necessitating a case by case deter-
mination of respective rights. Such was the case in Bums, where
the predecessor and successor were represented by different un-
ions, and Wiley, where one employer had no union involvements
at all. When the same union represents both predecessor and suc-
cessor employees, the situation is more easily resolved. One of the
major problems in the latter circumstance is with seniority status.
If new jobs are created or old ones eliminated, there is a very real
possibility that some form of "dovetailing" or "eliminating" will
be encountered. Recognizing that any such realignment is likely to
create some inequities for some of the employees, it may be possi-
ble to bargain with the union for a lump sum settlement to be used
to assuage hurt feelings and to balance inequities. 22 Such a solution
has the added dimension of putting the onus of soothing ruffled
feelings squarely on the union. Also, in the situation where the
same union represents all concerned employees, there is authority
that would allow the union to decline to honor its predecessor
contract and go to arbitration with the successor.2 One way to
alleviate much corporate suffering in this situation would be to
specifically define "successor" in the collective bargaining agree-
ment itself, so that both sides agree to the definition before the
21 Goldberg, The Labor Law Obligations of a Successor Employer, 63 Nw. U.L.
REv. 735, 748-55 (1968).
21 376 U.S. at 549.
2 Goldberg, supra note 20, at 759-60.
2 Bath Iron Works Corp. v. Bath Marine Draftmen's Ass'n., 393 F.2d 407 (1st
Cir. 1968).
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agreement goes into effect to preclude later challenges. Then, only
inequitable or unreasonable circumstantial changes would allow a
new party to set the agreement aside. 4 The implication of Wiley
is to bind the successor employer under the rationale that manage-
ment should have the right to negotiate any contract alterations
they seek with the union prior to their acquisition of the new busi-
ness interest. However, this implication was subsequently denied
in Howard Johnson, where the court held that the successor's re-
fusal to recognize the collective bargaining agreement was suffi-
cient to excuse the subsequent obligation to bargain. 5
All of the above problem situations assume prior union knowl-
edge of the impending corporate change. This may be too great an
assumption to make, because the union seldom knows about the
change until it is upon them. From the management's standpoint,
this is to court disaster. If the contract has language consistent
with the usual broad arbitration clause, the arbitrator will be
deemed to have power to correct inequities," and he can do this
in view of drastically changed circumstances, regardless of whether
they were foreseen. Again, a contractual definition of seniority,
termination rights, and other provisions could either prevent or
greatly alleviate subsequent conflict.
If Wiley diminished the power of the NLRB, then Burns di-
minishes it even more. In Bums the NLRB suffered a limitation
on its powers, which had been expanding to the point that they had
begun to infringe upon the freedom of contract. 7 Burns' concept
of successorship turned on nothing more than a bargaining unit
determination. Because Burns was decided by a 5-4 majority, and
because Justice William 0. Douglas, voting with the majority, has
since retired, the dissenting opinion will take on increased signifi-
cance.
In Burns, the original employer had a collective bargaining
agreement with his employees through their chosen certified
union," the United Plant Guards. The main employer, Lockheed,
24 United Steelworkers v. Reliance Universal, Inc., 335 F.2d 891 (3d Cir. 1964).
417 U.S. at 264.
335 F.2d 891, 895 (1964).
See 406 U.S. at 277.
The United Plant Guards (UPG) represented the employees of Wackenhut
Corporation, which had previously provided protection for Lockheed Aircraft Serv-
ice Company. The UPG had been duly certified by the NLRB by the election
procedure just four months before Lockheed decided to open the security contract
to bid. 406 U.S. at 274.
[Vol. 78
6
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 78, Iss. 4 [1976], Art. 6
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol78/iss4/6
STUDENT NOTES
who employed the security crews on a bid system, decided to re-
open the security operation for bid. The Burns detective agency,
with full knowledge that Wackenhut (the current security force)
had union-represented employees, bid successfully for the security
operation."
An important distinction from Wiley is that the Bums agency
was a completely independent competing corporation from Wack-
enhut. Once their bid was accepted, Burns proceeded to hire
twenty-seven guards that had previously been employed by Wack-
enhut. In addition, fifteen others were hired from other areas of the
Burns operation, and all were hired on the condition that they join
the American Federation of Guards (AFG), a union that was a rival
to the predecessor's UPG.3 0 This practice was later found to be a
violation of the NLRA, § 8(a)(2) .31 Noting that the bargaining unit
had remained essentially unchanged due to the hiring of most of
the former Wackenhut employees, and that a majority of the cur-
rent employees were therefore already represented by a certified
union, the NLRB found that all grievances filed by the UPG were
justified.2 The Board remedy was to require the Burns agency to
recognize the UPG as the bargaining representative for all Burns'
employees at Lockheed, and for the Burns management to recog-
nize the collective bargaining agreement previously accepted be-
tween the UPG and Wackenhut.? The forced recognition of the
substantive aspects of the agreement was overturned by the court
of appeals.3 4 The Supreme Court affirmed, noting that the NLRB
had exceeded its power.35 The Burns Court found that the Board's
reasoning had been predicated upon the findings of the Trial Ex-
aminer, who determined that the new bargaining unit contained a
majority of the predecessor's employees and that Burns, therefore,
incurred a duty to bargain since the employees were working on the
same jobs in the same place as they had in the past. The new
employer had urged decertification, but this contention was dis-
missed because the Court found that a mere change in ownership
is not such an unusual circumstance that it would change the
'Id.
Id. at 275.
' Id. at 276.
32 Id.
3 Id.
' Id. at 277.
SId.
Id. at 278.
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certification status . 3 Mr. Justice White made it clear that if the
operational structure of the Burns agency was so different as to
make the bargaining unit different, this case could have had a
different result. The Court, however, held that the bargaining unit
was the same and the majority of the old employees were carried
over, thereby binding the successor under a "majority" test."
Nonetheless, a duty to bargain does not mandate a duty to
accept the substantive terms of prior collective bargaining agree-
ments, nor to make any concessions not agreed to, as would be the
case if the new employer had to take over the substantive terms of
the old agreement." This conclusion is clear both from the legisla-
tive history and by express statutory mandate." Since freedom to
contract is one of the fundamental policies of the NLRA, it is
within the Board's duties and powers to safeguard it, not interfere
with it. Thus the NLRB ran contra to its own policies and prior
holdings by ordering the successor bound by the substantive
terms.4 The NLRB erroneously stretched their interpretation of
Wiley too far, relying on the language of Wiley to the effect that
collective bargaining agreements are not ordinary contracts, but
merely an outline of the common law of a particular plant or indus-
try. The NLRB failed to recall that Wiley was contested as a ques-
tion only of the extent to which the successor would be bound by
the arbitration clause, forcing arbitration only to that extent," but
preserving the right to challenge a disputed award in the courts. 3
A further distinction between Burns and Wiley is that Wiley
arose in the context of a section 301 dispute under the NLRA,
whereas Burns was initiated as an unfair labor practice suit, proce-
durally limited by the language of section 8(d) of the NLRA.4 The
only thing the Burns agency did was hire a majority of the prede-
cessor's employees, thus incurring a duty to bargain." Possibly, the
source of the duty to bargain did not even come from the collective
bargaining agreement, but rather from the fact that Burns, as a
1 Id. at 279.
31 Id. at 280-81.
2' Id. at 282.
o Id. at 282-83.
" Id. at 285.
42 Id.
Id. at 286.
" Id. at 285.
" Id. at 286.
[Vol. 78
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successor, took over a largely intact bargaining unit that had been
recently certified.46
Clearly, a successor should not be bound by the substantive
terms of a prior agreement to which it wasn't a party because the
successor and the union might need to make special concessions,
.such as an agreed cutback in demands to help revive a faltering
employer." Thus, both successor employer and employees could be
held to a bad bargain in light of the reorganization and tied to pre-
existing obligations outside the borders of the contract itself.8 For
reasons such as these, even the NLRB subsequently expressed
doubt as to the applicability of using their ruling in Burns as a
hard and fast rule. The Burns Court agreed with the Board's hind-
sight in their reversing opinion, noting that the holding of Bums
was limited to its facts.4 9
A converse consideration is that the existing collective bar-
gaining agreement could be beneficial for all parties concerned. In
such an instance, the NLRB would be permitted to find the ongo-
ing validity of the agreement as a matter of fact, but never as a
matter of law,5 especially in reorganizations of the corporate struc-
ture, where little or no change in the business activity occurs.
The majority opinion in Wiley noted some additional restric-
tions that fall to the successor employer: (1) he is proscribed from
making any unilateral changes between the terms of the collective
bargaining agreements,' and (2) the new employer may set his own
hiring terms, unless he intends to hire all of the employees in the
prior bargaining unit.2
The Burns dissent took serious exception to the majority's
treatment of the successor concept. In a separate opinion by Mr.
Justice Rehnquist, four justices argued that the majority's opinion
of the successor's duties was too expansive. There are some com-
pelling points in Mr. Justice Rehnquist's analysis, but none that
could prove fatal to the majority's successorship model. The first
46 Id. at 287.
' Id. at 290.
I d.
" Id. at 274.
Id. at 291.
In Burns, there was no previous relationship, and although this was of no
importance to the facts, yet inclusion in the opinion illustrates the importance the
Court attached to it. Id. at 294.
12 Id. at 295.
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argument was the lack of adequate proof to assure that a majority
of the employees carried over to subsequent employment voted for
the certified representative, or that the resultant employee group
contained a majority that had so voted. 3 This criticism could eas-
ily have been avoided by careful trial presentation. The second
argument attacks the bargaining unit determination in light of the
past history of the successor employer. 4 In Burns, the Burns
agency had a history of keeping many of its guards in a more or
less transient status, thus creating a problem for bargaining units
centered on a single geographic location.5 In effect, the challenge
to the successorship was really a challenge to the bargaining unit
itself. Since Burns and its predecessor, Wackenhut, were in direct
competition and were not joined by merger or consolidation, the
successor principle should have been narrowed to accommodate
the demands of the successor's business. Under such an analysis,
a successor employer can be burdened with bargaining difficulties
that a non-successor in the identical business situation would not.
Initially this consideration seems persuasive. However, the fact is
that a non-successor would not be interfering in any respect with
a previous build-up of job rights and employee security, whereas a
successor necessarily does.
With the preservation of the collective bargaining system as
its focal point, the Rehnquist opinion then outlined the factors that
could be persuasive in finding successorship. These included a
preference for continuity in labor relations,55 avoidance of in-
dustrial strife,'5 essential sameness of the subsequent employer
industry, 58 and the need to balance protection of employee rights
against management prerogatives." Thus, the limits of the bar-
gaining relationship can be those implied in Wiley, rejecting a
finding of successorship in instances that lack substantial business
continuity. 5 There are instances, however, in which any applica-
tion will probably result in inequities, regardless of planning and
execution. The dissent justified these inequities by noting that
" Id. at 297.
5, Id. at 298.
SId.
5, Id. at 300.
57 Id.
'AId.
' Id. at 301.
" Id. at 301-02.
[Vol. 78
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there were some areas of employer conduct in which the NLRA has
provided no remedy.'
The realities of the market place provide other difficulties as
well. As the market fluctuates, continued employment will man-
date the hiring away of employees from faltering industries. Forced
retention of the bargaining unit in cases of mass hiring could bur-
den the successor employer with the very concessions which caused
the prior employer to falter. Mr. Justice Rehnquist argued, there-
fore, that the successor should be free to challenge the bargaining
unit.2 Much of the conflict would be erased if, in all situations of
manifest similarity of business continuation by the successor, the
duty to bargain could be created at the insistence of either party
by a showing of an existing arbitration clause written to provide
relief. If both sides are willing, the previous contract can, of course,
be adopted with little effort. If any bargaining is to take place,
notice should be afforded to give all interested parties ample time
to prepare.
Into this setting came the Howard Johnson decision,3 which
involved a dispute arising from an operational takeover of a motel-
restaurant by the Howard Johnson Company. Prior to the take-
over, the Grissom family had operated the premises through the
family owned corporation under a franchise arrangement with the
Howard Johnson Company. The Grissoms negotiated with the
union and agreed to the collective bargaining agreement, which
contained both a successor and assigns clause and a dispute settle-
ment provision with procedures leading ultimately to arbitration.
Prior to the takeover, the Howard Johnson management expressly
notified the union that they would not assume any labor agree-
ments of the predecessor. The employees were given termination
notice just fourteen days prior to the change. The union was given
twelve days notice that Howard Johnson would not recognize the
union agreement for any purpose. Upon the transfer, Howard
Johnson conducted an open hiring period and retained only nine
of the fifty-three employees previously engaged by the Grissoms,
none of whom had been supervisors."' The union brought suit in
state court, claiming a "lockout" in violation of their collective
11 Id. at 304, citing Textile Workers v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263
(1965), and NLRB v. Am. Nat'l. Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395 (1952), as the leading cases.
406 U.S. at 308-10.
417 U.S. 249 (1974).
, Id. at 252.
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bargaining rights. Though an ex parte temporary restraining order
was granted, Howard Johnson ignored it, claiming lack of notice
and service, and the order was thereafter dissolved. Howard John-
son then moved to remove the suit to federal court on the ground
that the suit involved issues under section 301 of the LMRA. The
district court ordered Howard Johnson to arbitrate the extent of
its obligations to the employees union, but refused to issue an
injunction banning Howard Johnson from hiring other than the
Grissom employees. 5 The court of appeals affirmed. 6
The United States Supreme Court reversed the court of ap-
peals, holding that where there was no substantial continuity of
identity in the work force hired by the successor, and where the
successor had made no express or implied assumption of the agree-
ment to arbitrate, there was no obligation to arbitrate under the
predecessor's collective bargaining agreement. 7 The Howard
Johnson decision resurrected the "majority" test of employee
transfer to a determinative level. Whereas the lower courts had
found the rationale of Wiley to be persuasive and had emphasized
the merit of the substantial business continuity test,", the Howard
Johnson Court specifically noted that Wiley was a narrow holding
closely linked to determination on the merger aspects of the corpo-
rate change. 9 Unfortunately, this argument overlooked such per-
suasive criteria as the facts that the successor in Howard Johnson
took over all assets of the predecessor, retained the location and
identity of the business, preserved many identical products and
services, and underwent only a one minute gap in the continuing
flow of operations." The Court also rejected the significance of the
existence of a successor and assigns clause of which Howard John-
son had knowledge before they consummated the purchase.
Howard Johnson is the most drastic departure from the Wiley
rationale, in that the successor's knowledge of a specific successor
clause was rejected as not controlling.7' Lest one conclude that the
Howard Johnson decision has opened the door for management
escapism, it must be noted that the opinion predicated its result
81 L.R.R.M. 2329 (E.D. Mich. 1972) (mem.).
" 482 F.2d 489 (6th Cir. 1973).
67 417 U.S. at 249.
" Id. at 253.
S/d.
482 F.2d 489, 490.
417 U.S. at 251.
[Vol. 78
12
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 78, Iss. 4 [1976], Art. 6
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol78/iss4/6
STUDENT NOTES
on the fact that the predecessor corporation had not disappeared
as it did in Wiley.7" The union still had the Grissoms to proceed
against in a suit to determine the extent of liability incurred by the
breach of the successorship clause and the remedy available to
satisfy the claim.7 3 Furthermore, the Howard Johnson Court inti-
mated that the union had overlooked an additional preventive
remedy-an injunction against the proposed sale to Howard John-
son based on a breach of the successorship clause in the existing
collective bargaining agreement. 74 The Court seemed to overlook
the fact that the union received only twelve days notice of the
impending sale, hardly enough time to mount a major judicial
offensive.
By specific language, the Howard Johnson Court also failed to
adopt Burns as controlling, or to decide if there were irreconcilable
conflicts between Wiley and Burns.75 Instead, the opinion held that
each case of this nature must turn on its own facts,7 noting the
lack of congressional guidance77 and the cautious development of
federal labor common law under section 301 of the LMRA. 71 Al-
though this holding should eventually result in good law, it con-
tains the consequent disadvantage of lack of present predictabil-
ity.
Noting the importance attached to the development of federal
common law from the policies of our national labor laws, the
Howard Johnson Court went on to dismiss as unpersuasive the
distinction noted in Burns between unfair labor practice suits and
section 301 suits.7 Thus, the Howard Johnson decision enhances
predictability in that the interpretation of the successor employer's
rights can no longer turn on the forum in which the union chooses
to press its claim. Unfortunately, the decision ignores the argu-
ment made in Burns that an unfair labor practice proceeding is
limited by statute under section 8(d) of the NLRA, as to procedure
for termination." Under section 8(d), a union is to receive sixty
days notice of termination of the collective bargaining agreement,8
11 Id. at 257.
73 Id.
7 Id. at 258 n.3.
Id. at 256.
I" d.
77 Id.
19 Id.
79 Id.
406 U.S. at 285.
"' National Labor Relations Act § 8(d), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1970).
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yet by virtue of the Howard Johnson decision, the employer (Gris-
som) effectively terminated the agreement with only twelve days
notice to the union." Thus by a sale of assets, Grissom was allowed
to do indirectly what it could not do directly.
The Howard Johnson Court relegated to a footnote the argu-
ment that to allow Howard Johnson to escape arbitration would be
to encourage employers who were dissatisfied with their current
collective bargaining agreement to realign their business. 3 Such
treatment is a significant departure from the emphasis on protec-
tion of job rights proposed by Wiley. The Court found that Howard
Johnson was not merely an "alter ego" of the Grissom's corpora-
tion, and that this was not merely a paper transaction designed to
escape the collective bargaining agreement. 4 The facts of Howard
Johnson could reasonably support such a construction; however, a
definitive set of standards designed to prevent a reorganization
aimed solely at escaping collective bargaining liability could pre-
vent future abuse of employee rights.
The lack of standards becomes glaringly apparent in the situa-
tion where a business wishes to predict the effect on labor-
management relations of an internal reorganization, division, or
sale to a subsidiary. The alter ego test will obviously be a determi-
native factor, yet in the absence of judicial precedent and cast
against the background of a case by case approach, the determin-
ing factors could likely be resolved on the imagination and persua-
sion of counsel, rather than on the merits.
Clearly, the Supreme Court has avoided an opportunity to
make the successor concept more definitive. The only apparent
standard to emerge from Howard Johnson is the mandatory inclu-
sion of "continuity of the work force" within the "continuity of
identity in the business enterprise" test, 5 elevating the majority
test to pre-eminent status, reconciling Wiley to the extent that
Wiley relied on the "wholesale transfer"" of employees into- the
successor work force, and Burns, to the extent that it failed to do
SO." The only other common thread is the recognition that the
N1 417 U.S. at 252.
14 Id. at 259 n.5.
" Id.
Id. at 263.
376 U.S. at 551.
406 U.S. at 287.
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STUDENT NOTES
Howard Johnson decision was based on its own facts.-' Thus,
Howard Johnson moved away from the federal labor policy of en-
couraging arbitration, as delineated by the Steelworkers trilogy,
and the chance to create an equally definitive "Successors Trilogy"
must now await future decisions. 9
James A. Varner
13 406 U.S. at 274; 417 U.S. at 256, recognizing Wiley as meeting the case by
case determination standard.
81 Perhaps the Successor Doctrine should not be used at all. The pressing need
to balance management prerogative against employee job security rights could be
handled under the policy favoring arbitration in all instances of industrial disagree-
ment. This would allow prospective employer groups to take over moribund busi-
nesses that will only become functional if the "successor" can institute change. As
long as there are employee groups who can gain certification, there will continue to
be a duty to bargain. By freeing the consequent employer from the substantive
conditions of his predecessor's agreement, the substantive proscriptions that belea-
guered the former employer would not forestall business development by the succes-
sor. This would not be the case if the arbitrator would merely use the preceding
agreement to force the successor to the bargaining table, where he stands or falls
on his own ability. The duty to arbitrate both scope and extent of obligation would
then become a function of the precise wording of the arbitration clause, something
any successor would have access to prior to acquiring the successor interests. This
would solve a major flaw in Burns-the "all or nothing" approach geared solely to
the finding of successorship. The successor aspect would then be of secondary
importance, utilizing flexibility to effectuate the labor policy favoring arbitration.
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